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ABSTRACT
We develop a rational model of investors who choose which asset payoffs to acquire informa-
tion about, before forming portfolios. Scale economies in information acquisition lead investors
to specialize in learning about a set of highly-correlated assets. Knowing more about these
assets makes them less risky and more desirable to hold. Benefits to specialization compete
with benefits to diversification. The resulting asset portfolios appear under-diversified from the
perspective of standard theory, but are optimal. In equilibrium, information is a strategic sub-
stitute because assets that many investors learn about have low expected returns. Increasing
returns, combined with strategic substitutability leads ex-ante identical investors to specialize
in different information, and hold different portfolios. Information choice rationalizes investing
in a diversified fund and a set of highly-correlated assets, an allocation observed in the data but
usually deemed anomalous.
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An important outstanding question in finance is why investor portfolios are so concentrated.
This fact challenges standard portfolio theory, which stresses the benefits of diversification. How-
ever, when an investor can first choose what assets to learn about, scale economies in information
generate gains to specialization. We propose a new framework for analyzing joint learning and
portfolio choices where incentives to diversify and specialize compete. The model predicts the
cross-section of information sets that investors will acquire in equilibrium and uses this result to
bring portfolio theory and capital asset pricing model results closer to observed portfolios and
prices.
Analyzing investment and information choices jointly is valuable because it is the feedback
of one decision on the other that generates gains to specialization. When choosing information,
investors can acquire noisy signals about future payoffs of many assets, or they can specialize and
acquire precise information about a few assets. Choosing to learn more about an asset makes
investors expect to hold more of it, because for an average signal realization, they prefer an asset
they are better informed about. As expected asset holdings rise, returns to information increase;
one signal applied to one share generates less profit than the same signal applied to many shares.
Specialization arises because the more an investor holds of an asset, the more valuable it is to learn
about that asset; but the more an investor learns about the asset, the more valuable that asset is
to hold.
Investors have two means of reducing uncertainty and risk: They can learn about the payoffs
of assets they will hold, or they can diversify. The optimal strategy does some of each. Investors
hold some fraction of their assets in a diversified fund, about which they learn nothing, and hold
the other fraction in a set of highly-correlated assets that they specialize in learning about. In
equilibrium, ex-ante identical investors specialize in different risks. Assets that many investors
learn about command a lower risk premium. This makes investors want to research assets that
others are not researching, and hold portfolios unlike what the average investor holds.
The force behind specialization is a general one, increasing returns to information. Radner and
Stiglitz (1984) showed that the marginal value of information increases as more of it is obtained.
The idea that information about large investments is more valuable dates back to Wilson (1975).
He found that information value is increasing in a firm’s scale of operation. Applying these basic
economic insights to an information and portfolio choice problem, produces a theory of what in-
vestors should specialize in and how specialization and diversification trade-off. Embedding this
theory in a general equilibrium model tells us how investors’ learning choices interact and how
aggregate learning affects asset prices.
Starting with identical prior beliefs, investors can obtain additional signals about what the
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realizations of future asset payoffs will be. Information is not required to hold an asset (as in
Merton (1987)); rather it is a tool to reduce the conditional variance of the asset’s payoff. Because
we focus on the choice of what to learn, rather than how much to learn, we endow investors with
a fixed budget of signal precision to allocate across assets. This budget, which we call capacity, is
quantified as an increase in the generalized precision of posterior beliefs about asset payoffs, relative
to prior beliefs. After allocating capacity, the investor observes signals drawn from a distribution
whose precision he has chosen. Conditional on these signals, he solves a standard CARA-normal
portfolio problem. We examine the predictions of this model in both partial equilibrium and general
equilibrium settings.
Section II analyzes a partial equilibrium model where the investor takes asset prices as given.
When asset returns are uncorrelated, the investor chooses to learn about one asset. Because a
piece of information is most profitable when it is applied to many shares, the investor allocates her
capacity to the asset with the highest squared Sharpe ratio, the asset she is likely to hold most of.
She invests in a diversified portfolio and adds to that a “learning portfolio” consisting of a single
asset. When asset payoffs are correlated, the investor learns about a single risk factor instead of
a single asset. Her “learning portfolio” contains assets in proportion to their covariance with the
risk factor. In both cases, it is optimal for the investor with zero information capacity to hold
a diversified portfolio; our theory collapses to the standard model. As the investor’s information
capacity increases, holding a perfectly diversified portfolio is still feasible, but no longer optimal.
Specialization arises because of the interaction of the information and portfolio choice problems,
not because of the form of the information constraint. Even with a learning technology that
exhibits decreasing marginal returns, specialization, though moderated, still persists. With a small
amount of capacity, investors fully specialize in learning about one risk. Given sufficient information
capacity, the investor will learn about more than one risk factor (section II.C). The increase and
then decrease in the marginal value of information is similar to the more general learning results
in Keppo, Moscarini and Smith (2005).
Section III investigates a general equilibrium model where a continuum of investors interact
(as in Admati (1985)). Endogenous prices act as an additional source of information: they are a
noisy signal of what other investors know. While investors still have an incentive to specialize in
one risk factor, they also have an incentive to specialize in a different risk factor from the ones
other investors are learning about: Learning is a strategic substitute. The reason is that assets
that more investors learn about carry lower equilibrium returns, as their demand bids up the price.
When ex-ante identical investors choose to learn about different risk factors, they end up holding
different concentrated asset portfolios. Asset returns in our model are described by the CAPM that
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would hold if each investor had the average of all investors’ signal precisions. By characterizing
the aggregate allocation of capacity, we can determine what this heterogeneous-information CAPM
predicts for the cross-section of asset prices. When an asset’s value is correlated with large, high-
return risk factors, its price should be higher than the standard CAPM predicts.
Recent empirical research confirms the predictions of our theory. Many individuals hold under-
diversified portfolios of common stock, in addition to a well-diversified mutual fund. The median
retail investor at a large on-line brokerage company holds only 2.6 stocks (Barber and Odean
(2001)). These portfolios of directly-held equity not only contain too few stocks, but the stocks
they contain are positively correlated (Goetzmann and Kumar (2003)). But directly-held equities
are only 40% of the median household’s portfolio; the remaining 60% is in stock and bond mutual
funds (Polkovnichenko (2004)). Using Swedish data on investors’ complete wealth portfolio, Massa
and Simonov (2005) document similar facts. They rule out the explanation that this concentration
optimally hedges labor income risk.
If investors concentrate their portfolios because they have informational advantages, then con-
centrated portfolios should outperform diversified ones. In contrast, if transaction costs or behav-
ioral biases are responsible, then concentrated portfolios should offer no advantage. Ivkovic, Sialm
and Weisbenner (2005) find that concentrated investors outperform diversified ones by as much as
3% per year. This excess return is even higher for investments in local stocks, where natural infor-
mational asymmetries are most likely to be present (see also Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Coval and
Moskowitz (2001); Massa and Simonov (2005); Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005)). Likewise, mutual
funds with a higher concentration of assets by industry outperform diversified funds (Kacperczyk,
Sialm and Zheng (2005)). If some investors have higher capacity than others, they should con-
sistently earn higher returns. Indeed, the top 10% most successful investors do consistently earn
higher excess returns (Coval, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)), as do institutional investors with
degrees from more selective universities (Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). Finally, if asymmetric infor-
mation exists in the market, then investors who learn from prices should outperform investors who
buy and hold a market index. Using CRSP data (1927-2000), Biais, Bossaerts and Spatt (2004)
show that price-contingent strategies generate annual returns (Sharpe ratios) that are 3% (16.5%)
higher than the indexing strategy. These results highlight the economic importance of asymmetric
information and help to rationalize the multi-billion dollar financial management industry.
Why is it relevant to consider information constraints when so much investment is professionally
managed? While individuals can avoid processing information by paying a mutual fund manager,
even fund managers must decide which stocks to follow, which reports to read and what research
to do. The model could be reinterpreted as solving a fund manager’s problem. This manager can
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earn excess returns from active portfolio management, even though markets are efficient. Section
IV relates our results to traditional theories of active portfolio management (Treynor and Black
(1973)). In the conclusion, we sketch a model with a market for portfolio management services.
Our results could extend the one asset model of Garcia and Vanden (2005) to better understand
the relationship between fund styles and expected returns.
Many theories in economics and finance have predictions that depend crucially on what in-
formation investors have. This information is usually treated as an endowment. By asking what
information rational investors would want to acquire, predictions contingent on information sets
can be turned into more general predictions. This paper provides a tractable framework and set of
tools for analyzing optimal information choices and incorporating those choices into commonly-used
models of portfolio composition and asset pricing.
I. Setup
This is a static model which we break up into 3-periods. In period 1, the investor chooses the
variance of signals about asset payoffs. That choice is constrained by information capacity, which
bounds the total precision of the signals, and by principal components analysis, which limits the
linear combinations of signals the investor can choose and keeps the problem tractable. In period 2,
the investor observes signals and then chooses what assets to purchase. In period 3, he receives the
asset payoffs and realizes his utility. Signal choices and portfolio choices in this setting are circular:
What an investor wants to learn depends on what he thinks he will invest in and what he wants
to invest in depends on what he has learned. To ensure that beliefs and actions are consistent, we
use backwards induction. We first solve the period 2 portfolio problem for arbitrary beliefs. Then,
we substitute the optimal portfolio rule into the period 1 information optimization problem.
The vector of unknown asset payoffs f ∼ N (µ,Σ) is what the investor will devote capacity
to learning about. After learning, the investor will have posterior beliefs about asset payoffs:
f ∼ N(µˆ, Σ̂). Let r be the risk-free return and q and p are Nx1 vectors of the number of shares the
investor chooses to hold and the asset prices. Following Admati (1985), we call fi − rpi the excess
return on asset i. Investors have mean-variance utility with absolute risk aversion parameter ρ:
U = E
[
q′(f − pr)− ρ
2
q′Σ̂q
∣∣∣ µ] . (1)
Mean-variance utility arises in settings where investors have negative exponential utility and
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face normally distributed payoffs.1 It allows a tractable solution to an equilibrium model, while
treating learned information and prior information as equivalent. This investor chooses information
that maximizes his expected utility at the time when he must make his portfolio decision. When
choosing what to learn, our investor asks himself, “When I invest, what information would I most
like to know?”
Period-2 investment problem Let µˆ and Σ̂ be the mean and variance of payoffs, conditional
on all information known to the investor in period 2. The investor chooses q to maximize
E[q′(f − pr)− ρ
2
q′Σ̂q|µˆ, µ]. (2)
Updating Beliefs At time 1, the investor chooses how to allocate his information capacity by
choosing a normal distribution from which he will draw an N × 1 signal η about asset payoffs.2 At
time 2, the investor will combine his signal η ∼ N(f,Ση) and his prior belief µ ∼ N(f,Σ), using
Bayes’ law. His posterior belief about the asset payoff f has a mean
µˆ ≡ E[f |µ, η] = (Σ−1 +Σ−1η )−1 (Σ−1µ+Σ−1η η) (3)
and a variance that is a harmonic mean of the prior and signal variances:
Σ̂ ≡ V [f |µ, η] = (Σ−1 +Σ−1η )−1 . (4)
These are the conditional mean and variance that investors use to form their portfolios in period 2.
Since every signal variance Ση has a unique posterior belief variance Σ̂ associated with it, we can
economize on notation and optimize over posterior belief variance Σ̂ directly. Prior (unconditional)
variances and covariances are not random; they are given. Posterior (conditional) variances are also
not random; they are choice variables that summarize the investor’s optimal information decision.
Capacity Constraint There are 2 constraints governing how the investor can choose his signals.
The first constraint is the capacity constraint. The work on information acquisition with one risky
asset quantified information as the ratio of variances of prior and posterior beliefs (Verrecchia
1It is equivalent to U = E [− log (E [exp (−ρW ) |µˆ, µ]) |µ], where W = rW0 + q′(f − pr) by the budget constraint
and payoffs f are normally distributed. This formulation of utility is related to Epstein and Zin (1989) preference for
early resolution of uncertainty and Hansen and Sargent (2004) models of risk-sensitive control.
2Choosing normally distributed signals η is optimal. When an objective is quadratic, normal distributions max-
imize the entropy over all distributions with a given variance (see Cover and Thomas (1991), Chapter 10). As we
show below, the objective in our problem is quadratic: E
[
1
2
(µˆ− pr)′Σ̂−1(µˆ− pr)|µ
]
.
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(1982)). The more information a signal contains, the more the posterior variance of the asset falls
below the prior variance, and the more information capacity is required to observe the signal. We
generalize this metric to an multi-signal setting by calling capacity the ratio of the generalized prior
variance to the generalized posterior variance, where generalized variance refers to the determinant
of the variance-covariance matrix:
|Σ|
|Σ̂| ≤ e
2K (5)
The amount of capacity K bounds the reduction in uncertainty of payoffs due to the knowledge of
the signal η.3
This capacity constraint is one possible description of a learning technology. We think it is a
relevant constraint because it is a commonly-used distance measure in econometrics (a log likeli-
hood ratio) and in statistics (a Kullback-Liebler distance4); it is equivalent to a bound on entropy
reduction, which has a long history in information theory as a quantity measure for information
(Shannon (1948)); it is a measure of information complexity (Cover and Thomas (1991)); it can be
interpreted as a reduction in measurement error. It has been previously used in economics and fi-
nance (Sims (2003) and Peng (2004)) to model limited mental processing ability in a representative
investor framework. That having been said, this particular formulation of the learning technology
is not crucial for the results. Our capacity constraint is a way to describe a feasible set of learning
possibilities that is rich enough to analyze the trade-off between diversification and specialization
in learning. Section II.C considers an alternative learning technology, one with decreasing returns.
The incentive to specialize persists, but is moderated. Finally, while studying the extensive margin
of information acquisition is interesting, adding a cost for capacity won’t change the nature of the
capacity allocation decision. For every cost, there is an amount of capacity K that produces an
identical result. In sum, because the increasing returns to specialization show up in the objec-
tive, through the endogenous portfolio choice, specialization is robust to changes in the learning
technology.
No Negative Learning Constraint The second constraint is that the variance-covariance ma-
trix of the signals must be positive semi-definite.
Ση positive semi-definite (6)
3To see the role of the signal, the capacity constraint can be restated as a bound on the precision Σ−1η of signals
η: |Σ−1η Σ+ I| ≤ e2K .
4In statistics, this distance is used as a measure of how difficult it is to distinguish one distribution from another.
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Without this constraint, the investor could increase uncertainty about one variable in order to
obtain a more precise signal about another, without violating the capacity constraint. Ruling out
increasing uncertainty implies that investors cannot forget nor see signals with negative information
content.
Learning About Correlated Risks When asset payoffs co-vary, learning about one asset’s pay-
off is informative about others. To keep track of what is being learned about, we describe signals
by how much information they contain about each principal component of asset payoffs. Studying
principal component risks is a well-established idea in the portfolio literature (Ross (1976)). Prin-
cipal components, or risk factors, are linear combinations of underlying assets that do not covary
with each other. An eigen-decomposition splits the prior variance-covariance matrix Σ into a diag-
onal eigenvalue matrix Λ, and an eigenvector matrix Γ: Σ = ΓΛΓ′. The Λi’s are the variances of
each risk factor i. The ith column of Γ (denoted by Γi) gives the loadings of each asset on the ith
risk factor. Investors obtain signals about the payoffs of risk factors f ′Γi. This does not rule out
learning about many risks. It does rule out signals with correlated information about risks that
are independent. For example, if oil price risk and rainfall were two independent risks, an investor
could not observe their sum without acquiring a signal about each. Effectively, we assume that the
investor cannot choose to observe signals about these zero-probability events.
Appendix B shows that the key results, specialization and strategic substitutability, hold for any
given set of orthogonal risk factors. However, this particular decomposition simplifies the problem.
Investors will have posterior beliefs with the same eigenvectors as their prior beliefs (Σ̂ = ΓΛˆΓ′),
but with lower weights Λˆi on some risks they chose to learn about. The decrease in risk factor
variance Λi − Λˆi captures how much an investor learned about that risk.
The Investor’s Problem
1. The investor chooses {Λˆi}Ni=1, the variance of posterior beliefs about each risk factor, to
maximize (1), subject to the capacity constraint (5), the no-negative learning constraint (6),
and rational expectations about q.
2. Given a signal η about asset payoffs f , posterior means µˆ and variances Σ̂ are formed according
to Bayes’ law (3) and (4).
3. Investors choose optimal portfolios q to maximize (2).
The sequence of events is summarized in figure I.
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time 1 time 2 time 3 
Information Σ 
chosen             
f ~ N(µ,Σ)              
µ ~ N( µ, Σ − Σ) 
Signals realized.            
New belief µ formed.       
Asset shares (q)             
chosen                       
f ~ N(µ,Σ) 
Payoff f 
realized 
^ ^ 
^  ^ 
^ 
^ 
Figure 1. Sequence of events in partial equilibrium model
The optimal portfolio q? is given by the first order condition of (2):
q? =
1
ρ
Σ̂−1(µˆ− pr). (7)
The model does not rule out short sales: q? < 0 when µˆ− pr < 0. Any remaining initial wealth is
invested in the risk-free asset.
Substituting the optimal portfolio choice into (1) delivers the utility that results from having
any beliefs µˆ, Σ̂ and investing optimally. The period-1 problem then amounts to choosing informa-
tion (beliefs) optimally to maximize U = E
[
1
2(µˆ− pr)′Σ̂−1(µˆ− pr)|µ
]
, where posterior means are
random: (µˆ − pr) ∼ N(E[µˆ − pr], VER), and VER ≡ V ar[µˆ − pr|µ]. Taking the expectation of a
non-central χ2-distributed random variable, the time-1 problem is to maximize
max
Σ̂
1
2
Tr(Σ̂−1VER) +
1
2
E[µˆ− pr]′Σ̂−1E[µˆ− pr]. (8)
II. Partial Equilibrium Results
A. Independent Assets
To gain intuition, it is helpful to first consider a simple case with N assets whose payoff variance-
covariance matrix Σ is diagonal. Choosing signals with the same principal components as asset
payoffs implies that signals are independent as well. The next section will generalize the problem
to correlated assets.
When investors takes prices as given, E[µˆ−pr] = µ−pr and VER = var[µˆ|µ] = Σ− Σ̂. Because
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the trace of a matrix is the sum of its eigenvalues, we can rewrite (8) as
max{Σ̂11,··· ,Σ̂NN}
1
2
{−N +
N∑
i=1
Σii
Σ̂ii
+
N∑
i=1
θ2i
Σii
Σ̂ii
}. (9)
The constraints become
s.t.
N∏
i=1
Σii
Σ̂ii
= exp(2K) and
Σii
Σ̂ii
≥ 1, ∀i
where θ2i is the prior squared Sharpe ratio of asset i: θ
2
i ≡ (µi−pir)
2
Σii
. The first constraint results from
(5) and the fact that the determinant of a diagonal matrix is the product of the diagonal entries.
The second constraint uses (6), (4) and the fact that a diagonal matrix is positive semi-definite if
and only if all its elements are non-negative.
The key feature of the learning problem (9) is that it is convex in the variance Σ̂ii. It is the
convexity of the objective that delivers a corner solution. The corner solution is to reduce variance
(increase precision) on the risk factor with the highest weight (θ2i ) as much as possible.
Proposition 1. The optimal information portfolio with N independent assets uses all capacity to
learn about one asset, the asset with the highest squared Sharpe ratio θ2i = (µi − pir)2Σ−1ii .
Proof is in appendix A. For intuition, consider the problem of sequentially assigning units of
capacity that can reduce the variance of an asset’s payoff from Σii to Σ̂ii = (1− ²)Σii. The greatest
utility gain is obtained by assigning the first unit of capacity to the asset with the highest value
of (µi − pir)2Σ−1ii . The value of assigning the next unit of capacity to asset i is then even greater:
(µi − pir)2Σ̂−1ii > (µi − pir)2Σ−1ii . The value of assigning each subsequent unit of capacity to i
rises higher and higher, while the value of assigning capacity to all other assets remains the same.
Therefore, the optimal choice of posterior variance is Σ̂ii = e−2KΣii, and Σ̂jj = Σjj for all j 6= i.
The value of learning about an asset is indexed by its squared Sharpe ratio (µi − pir)2Σ−1ii .
Another way to express the same quantity is as the product of two components: (µi − pir) and
(µi − pir)/Σii, which is ρE[qi] for an investor who has zero capacity. An investor wants to learn
about an asset that has (i) high expected excess returns (µi − pir), and (ii) features prominently
in his (expected) portfolio E[qi]. The fact that an investor wants to invest all capacity in one asset
comes from the anticipation of his future portfolio position E[q]. The more shares of an asset he
expects to hold, the more valuable information about those shares is, and the higher the index
value he assigns to learning about the asset. But, as he learns more about the asset, the amount
he expects to hold E[qi] = (µi−pir)/(ρΣ̂ii) rises. As he learns, devoting capacity to the same asset
9
becomes more and more valuable. This is the increasing return to learning.
How does this learning strategy affect the investor’s portfolio? For the assets that the investor
does not learn about, the number of shares does not change. For the asset he does learn about,
the expected number of shares increases by E[qlearn] = 1ρΣii (µi − pir)(e2K − 1). Call the portfolio
of shares that the investor would hold if he had zero-capacity and could not learn, qdiv. This is the
benchmark portfolio predicted by the standard CARA-normal model. Since it contains no signals,
it is not random: E[qdiv] = qdiv. The portfolio of an investor with positive capacity is the sum of
qdiv and the component due to learning, qlearn, (plus his position in the risk free asset).
Proposition 2. As long as there is at least one asset i for which (µi − pir) 6= 0, then when
capacity rises, the expected fraction of the optimal portfolio consisting of fully-diversified assets
(|qdiv|/(|qdiv|+ |E[qlearn]|) falls.
Proof : As capacity (K) increases from zero, the zero-capacity portfolio qdiv is, by definition,
unchanged. As long as there is an asset s.t. (µi − pir) 6= 0, then proposition 1 tells us that an
investor will learn about an asset i? s.t. (µi? − pi?r) 6= 0. The only quantity that changes in K
is the expected amount of asset i? held due to learning: |E[qlearni? ]| = 1ρΣi?i? |µi? − pi?r|(e
2K − 1).
Since µi? − pi?r 6= 0, |E[qlearni? ]| is strictly increasing in K. ¤
Only expected portfolio holdings can be predicted. Since actual signal realizations and therefore
posterior beliefs µˆ are random variables, the true portfolio chosen in period 2 could be either larger
or smaller in absolute value, than it would have been without the signal. But, for any given belief
about payoffs µˆi, having more capacity to reduce the variance of that belief Σ̂ii, makes the investor
take a larger position in the asset |qi|.
This result can be easily restated in terms of the more familiar value-weighted fraction of
shares in the learning and diversified funds. As long as the expected excess return and price for
the learning asset i are positive, then the expected value-weighted fraction of shares held in the
diversified portfolio falls. This is the sense in which learning and diversification trade off.
Corollary 1. An investor who optimally chooses a less diversified portfolio earns a higher expected
return than an investor who chooses a more diversified portfolio.
Proof in appendix C. Proposition 2 tells us that investors who have high information capaci-
ties K choose highly under-diversified portfolios. Such investors makes more informed investment
choices and obtain a higher expected profit. The reason is that these investors achieve a higher cor-
relation between asset payoffs and portfolio shares: they hold a long position when the asset is likely
to have a high payoff and a short position when the asset payoff is likely to be low. This prediction
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is corroborated empirically by the findings of Ivkovic et al. (2005) and Kacperczyk et al. (2005).
They show that investors with concentrated portfolios buy stocks have consistently higher returns
than the stocks they sell, so that under-diversified portfolios significantly outperform diversified
ones. This finding is present across wealth groups.
Data Example with Independent Assets
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Figure 2. Under-Diversification and the Increasing Returns to Learning: Uncorrelated Assets.
We illustrate the portfolio composition with a simple numerical example. Figure 2 illustrates
the case of three uncorrelated S&P 500 assets.5 The monthly excess returns on AT&T, Chevron,
and JP Morgan were nearly orthogonal in the sample period. Chevron had the highest Sharpe ratio
(.58 annualized). When faced with the mean excess returns and the covariance matrix of returns
of three assets, an investor with zero information capacity would hold an optimally diversified
portfolio, consisting of 28% AT&T, 48% Chevron, and 24% JP Morgan (‘diversified portfolio’).
When given some information capacity, the investor specializes in learning about Chevron. (K = .5
here, which allows the investor to reduce the standard deviation of one asset by 39%.) The ‘learning
fund’ is fully invested in Chevron. As a result, the total portfolio is under-diversified: 15% AT&T,
72% Chevron, and 13% JP Morgan.
B. Correlated assets
When assets are correlated, signals about individual asset payoffs are no longer principal compo-
nents. Instead, principal components are linear combinations of asset payoffs with weights on each
asset given by an eigenvector of Σ. Rather than reduce the risk of independent assets, investors now
5Monthly return data runs from November 1986 and December 2003 (206 observations). Excess returns are
constructed by subtracting the return on a 1-month T-bill.
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choose how to reduce the variance of these independent risk factors. The factors could represent
risks such as business cycle risk, pharmaceutical industry risk, or idiosyncratic risk. The variance
of each risk factor is given by its eigenvalue (Λi). After transforming assets into independent risk
factors, the results for independent assets can be restated for the correlated assets case.
When an investor learns about principal components, his posterior belief variance Σ̂ has the
same eigenvectors (Γ) as Σ. Therefore, the investor’s choice is over the diagonal eigenvalue matrix
Λˆ, where Σ̂ = Γ̂ΛˆΓ̂′. The investor solves problem (9), where the prior squared Sharpe ratios θ2i
now refer to risk factors: θ2i ≡ ((µ−pr)
′Γi)2
Λi
. The capacity constraint still takes the form
∏N
i=1
Λi
Λˆi
=
exp(2K) because the determinant of ΣΣ̂−1 is the product of its eigenvalues ΛiΛˆ−1i and because
Σ and Σ̂ share eigenvectors Γ. The no-negative learning constraint, which requires Σ − Σ̂ to be
positive semi-definite, or equivalently that all its eigenvalues are non-negative becomes Λi
Λˆi
≥ 1.
Proposition 3. The optimal information portfolio with N correlated assets uses all capacity to
learn about one linear combination of asset payoffs. The linear combination coefficients are given
by the eigenvector Γi, with the highest factor squared Sharpe ratio θ2i = ((µ− pr)′Γi)2 Λ−1i .
The proof follows immediately from proposition 1 and the new definition of θ2i . There are two
components of this result. The first component tells us how the investor initially ranks learning
about each risk factor Γi. The second tells us that he specializes completely in whatever risk factor
he ranks first. What direction an investor decides to learn in is determined by the magnitude of
the expected return on the risk factor Γ′i(µ− pr) and by ρ times the expected holding of that risk
factor: ρΓ′iE[q]. The fact that the investor wants to devote all capacity to learning about one risk
factor comes from increasing returns, and does not depend on the particular risk factor structure
(see appendix B). As the investor learns more about risk factor i, the investor expects to hold
more of that risk factor: Γ′iE[q] grows. As he expects to hold more of the risk factor, the value of
learning more about it rises.
What does this result mean for portfolio allocation? The investor will hold shares of each asset
given by 1ρ(ΓΛˆΓ
′)−1(µˆ−pr). Again, this portfolio can be decomposed into the diversified benchmark
portfolio that an investor with no capacity would hold qdiv = 1ρ(ΓΛΓ
′)−1(µˆ− pr), and the number
of extra shares of assets that will be held due to learning,
qlearn =
e2K − 1
ρΛi
ΓiΓ′i(µˆ− pr)
where i is the factor the investor optimally learns about. This learning portfolio puts more weight
on assets in proportion to how correlated they are with the risk factor that the investor is learning
about. Since the ‘learning’ assets are highly correlated with a common risk factor, they are also
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highly correlated with each other. As K grows, the expected weight on this highly-correlated
component of the portfolio rises. As learning increases, diversification falls.
Data Example with Correlated Assets
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Figure 3. Under-Diversification and the Increasing Returns to Learning: Correlated Assets.
Figure 3 illustrates the case of correlated assets. It adds to the three uncorrelated assets
described above a fourth asset, Cisco. Cisco has a low correlation with Chevron (-.008) and with
JP Morgan (.068), but a high correlation with AT&T (.296). Cisco has a much higher Sharpe
ratio than the other three firms. When offered these four assets, an investor with zero information
capacity would hold an optimally diversified portfolio, consisting of -1% AT&T, 39% Chevron, 13%
JP Morgan, and 49% Cisco (‘diversification fund’). When given some information capacity (K is
still .5 here), the investor learns about Cisco, the most valuable asset to learn about, but also about
AT&T. The reason is that both Cisco and AT&T load positively on the most valuable risk factor
(correlations .96 and .27 respectively). The ‘learning fund’ is invested for 75% in Cisco and 21%
in AT&T. As a result of the specialization in learning, the total portfolio is under-diversified: 10%
AT&T, 19% Chevron, 9% JP Morgan, and 62% Cisco. The new optimal portfolio has a variance
(conditioning on past public information) that is 25% higher than the diversified portfolio variance;
it is under-diversified.
C. Un-Learnable Risk and Decreasing Returns to Learning
In the previous results, investors never diversify their information because learning substitutes for
diversification. As learning increases and risk falls, the value of diversification falls as well. With
un-learnable risk, there is some risk that learning cannot eliminate, but diversification can. This
risk revives some benefits to diversification and makes high-capacity investors learn about multiple
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risk factors. Thus, high capacity investors may hold more diversified portfolios than low capacity
investors. This could explain why portfolios of individual investors tend to be less diversified than
portfolios of institutional investors.
Adding un-learnable risk is also a way of generating decreasing returns to learning. Because
this has intuitive appeal as an alternative learning technology, we explore its implications here. We
find that a learning technology that embodies decreasing returns to specialization does not restore
full diversification; it just moderates the extent of specialization. This reinforces the point that
specialization is driven by increasing returns to information, not the form of the capacity constraint.
When all risk is learnable and capacity approaches infinity, the payoff variance of some portfolio
approaches zero, an arbitrage arises, and profit becomes infinite. Un-learnable risk imposes a finite,
maximum benefit to learning. To reduce an asset’s learnable payoff variance to near zero costs an
unbounded amount of information capacity and yields only a finite benefit. Therefore, learning an
arbitrarily large amount about a single asset is never optimal.
In the modified model, the investor’s preferences, the sequence of events, and the optimal
period-2 portfolio remains unchanged. The period-1 choice of signal distributions is constrained by
the fact that of the total variance in the prior beliefs Σ, αΣ is un-learnable, and only (1−α)Σ can
be learned (0 < α < 1).6 The new period-1 problem is to maximize (8) subject to a constraints on
the reduction in entropy of the learnable component of asset payoffs. This constraint is formulated
so that eliminating all learnable risk (reducing Σ̂ to αΣ) requires infinite capacity. When Σ̂ = Σ,
the investor is not learning anything, and no capacity is required.
|Σ− αΣ|
|Σ̂− αΣ| ≤ e
2K (10)
The no-negative learning constraint is as before.
As before, the investor chooses the posterior variance Λˆ of given risk factors Γ to maximize (1)
subject to (10) and no-negative learning (6). The first-order condition with respect to Λˆi describes
an interior solution to the maximization problem:
(1 + θ2i )
Λi
−Λˆ2i
= ξ
1
Λˆi − αΛi
− φi, (11)
where ξ is the Lagrange multiplier on (10), and φi is the Lagrange multiplier on the no-learning
constraint. The left hand side is the marginal benefit of learning about risk factor i, the right hand
side is the marginal cost. Once the variance of payoff i has been reduced sufficiently (Λˆi < 2αΛi),
6For every result, except proposition 6, α can be a matrix where every element is 0 < αij < 1.
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the second derivative reveals that the Λˆi that solves (11) is an interior maximum.
Proposition 4. When there is un-learnable risk, the number of risk factors that the investor learns
about is an increasing step function of K.
Corollary 2. When there is un-learnable risk and asset payoffs are independent, the number of
assets held in the ‘learning fund,’ qlearn, is an increasing step function of capacity K.
Proofs are in appendix D.
The reason for learning about additional assets can be seen by examining the marginal benefit
and the marginal cost of learning. As the investor learns more and Λˆi decreases, the marginal
benefit increases. Increasing returns to scale in learning are still present. However, the marginal
cost is now also convex in Λˆi. The difference of the two, the net marginal benefit, first increases
until Λˆi = 2αΛi, and then decreases. In the limit, as the investor gets closer to learning all the
learnable risk (Λˆi → αΛi), the marginal cost approaches infinity. Therefore, there is some finite
cutoff level of Λˆi such that when the investor reaches this level of learning for asset i, he begins to
allocate some capacity to another risk factor. When assets are independent, allocating capacity to
another risk factor means learning about another asset, and including the additional asset in the
learning fund.
Proposition 5. When there is un-learnable risk and there is some asset i with non-zero expected
excess return (µi − pir) 6= 0, then, as capacity rises, the fraction of the expected optimal portfolio
consisting of fully-diversified assets (|qdiv|/(|qdiv|+ |E[qlearn]|) falls.
Proof is in appendix E.
When the investor learns more about an asset, he expects to hold a larger position in that asset.
Since the zero-capacity portfolio qdiv does not change as capacity increases and more shares are
held in the learning portfolio, the fraction of the expected portfolio that is diversified falls.
Proposition 6. When there is un-learnable risk and capacity is infinite, the expected learning
portfolio is fully diversified: limk→∞E[qlearn] =
(
1
α − 1
)
qdiv.
Proof : An investor with an infinite capacity would eliminate all learnable risk, setting Λˆ = αΛ,
which implies Σ̂ = αΣ. In this limit, the learning fund is E[qlearn] = 1ρ
(
1
α − 1
)
Σ−1(µ − pr), a
scaled-up copy of the diversified mutual fund. ¤
Putting the results together tells us that as capacity increases, diversification falls, and then
rises again. An investor with zero capacity holds only the diversified fund. An investor with
infinite capacity holds a perfectly diversified learning fund. In between the two perfectly diversified
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extremes, the investor with positive, finite capacity to learn is optimally under-diversified. So, an
(individual) investor with low capacity would learn about fewer risk factors than an (institutional)
investor with high capacity, and consequently hold a less diversified portfolio.
III. Equilibrium Information and Investment Choices
In general equilibrium, an investor must consider the information acquisition and investment strate-
gies of other investors. Information is a strategic substitute in this setting: Investors want to learn
about assets that others are not learning about. In equilibrium, this means that ex-ante identical
investors will choose to observe different signals and will hold different assets. When all risk is
learnable, the nature of the solution to the individuals problem does not change. After accounting
for the actions that other investors will take and how these will affect asset prices, an investor
chooses one risk factor and concentrates all his capacity on learning about that one factor. We
begin by describing the modifications to the setup.
A. Setup
There is now a continuum of atomless investors, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Preferences and payoffs
are identical to the model described in section I. We continue to hold the risk-free rate fixed.
Two additional assumptions are required. First, the per capita supply of the risky asset is x¯ + x,
a constant plus a random (n × 1) vector with known mean and variance, and zero covariance
across assets: x ∼ N(0, σ2xI). This risky asset supply creates noise in the price level that prevents
investors perfectly inferring the private information of others. Without it, there would be no private
information, and no incentive to learn. We interpret this noise as liquidity shocks, life-cycle needs
of traders, or errors that investors make when inverting prices.7
Second, we assume that noisy asset payoff signals are independent. Each investor adds his own
noise when he interprets his information. An alternative mechanism would be a news agency that
produces a noisy signal of the truth and transmits that same signal to all of investors. We revisit
the idea of centralized markets for information processing in the conclusion.
Asset prices p are determined by market clearing: the sum of investors’ demands for each asset
equals its supply. ∫ 1
0
Σ̂−1j (µˆj − pr)dj = x¯+ x (12)
7See Biais et al. (2004) for an interpretation in terms of risky non-tradeable endowments.
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B. Individual’s Asset Allocation in Equilibrium
As before, we work backwards, starting with the optimal portfolio decision. In period 2, investors
have three pieces of information that they aggregate to form their expectation of the assets’ payoffs:
their prior beliefs (common across investors), their signals (draws from distributions chosen in period
1), and the equilibrium asset price.
Proposition 7. Asset prices are a linear function of the asset payoff and the unexpected component
of asset supply.
p =
1
r
(A+Bf + Cx)
This price is also a function of the posterior mean and variance of the ‘average’ investor:
p =
1
r
(
µˆa − ρΣ̂a(x¯+ x)
)
where the average posterior mean is µˆa =
∫ 1
0 µˆjdj and the ’average’ posterior variance is a harmonic
mean of all investors’ variances Σ̂a =
(∫ 1
0 Σ̂
−1
j dj
)−1
.
Proof is in appendix F, along with the formulas for A, B and C.
If prices take this form, then the mean and variance of the asset payoff, conditional on prices
are E[f |p] = B−1(rp − A) and V [f |p] = σ2xB−1CC ′B−1′ ≡ Σp. Denote its eigenvalue matrix by
Λp. Then, posterior beliefs about the asset payoff f , conditional on prior beliefs µ ∼ N(f,Σ),
signals η ∼ N(f,Ση), and prices, can be expressed using standard Bayesian updating formulas.
The posterior mean belief about f is
µˆ ≡ E[f |µ, η, p] = (Σ−1 +Σ−1η +Σ−1p )−1 (Σ−1µ+Σ−1η η +Σ−1p B−1(rp−A)) (13)
with variance that is a harmonic mean of the three signal variances.
Σˆ ≡ V [f |µ, η, p] = (Σ−1 +Σ−1η +Σ−1p )−1 . (14)
These are the conditional mean and variance that investors use to form their portfolios in period
2. As in the partial equilibrium problem, optimal portfolios are formed according to equation (7).
Only the conditioning information changes.
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C. Individual’s Information Capacity Allocation in Equilibrium
In period 1, the investor chooses a covariance matrix for his posterior beliefs Σ̂, just as in the partial
equilibrium problem. The difference is that at time 1, the time-2 expected excess return (µˆ− pr) is
now distributed (µˆ− pr) ∼ N ((I −B)µ−A, VER) where VER ≡ Σ− Σ̂ +BΣB′ + CC ′σ2x − 2ΣB′.
Using equation (8), the period-1 objective is:
max
Σ̂
{
1
2
Tr(Σ̂−1VER) +
1
2
((I −B)µ−A)′Σ̂−1((I −B)µ−A)
}
. (15)
Just as in partial equilibrium, the choice of posterior covariance matrix Σ̂ is subject to two
constraints. The constraints are formally the same as in section I, but require re-interpretation.
The first constraint is that the total information the investor sees cannot reduce the generalized
variance of payoffs by more than e2K . Being a constraint on the distance between the posterior
belief variance Σ̂ and the prior belief variance Σ, it assumes that investors use capacity to extract
payoff relevant information both from private signals η and from prices. Some capacity must be
devoted to price discovery; the remaining capacity can be optimally allocated to signals.8 The
second constraint is the equivalent of (6). This no-negative learning constraint prevents investors
from forgetting information that is either contained in priors or in prices.
(Σ−1 +Σ−1p )
−1 − Σ̂ positive semi-definite (16)
where (Σ−1 + Σ−1p )−1 = V [f |µ, p] is what the conditional variance of asset payoffs would be if the
investor observed priors and prices, but no private signals.
The sequence of events is as in the partial equilibrium problem, except that at time 2, prices p
are revealed, in addition to private signals η.
As in partial equilibrium, learning about principal components of asset payoffs implies that
prior and posterior variances have the same eigenvectors. This allows us to recast the problem in
terms of eigenvalues. Recall the definition of the prior squared Sharpe ratio of risk factor i:
θ2i ≡
(E[Γ′i(f − pr)])2
V ar[Γ′if ]
=
(((I −B)µ−A)′Γi)2
Λii
. (17)
8In the partial equilibrium problem the capacity constraint on signals was |I + ΣΣ−1η | ≤ e2K ; in the general
equilibrium setting it becomes |I +ΣΣ−1η +ΣΣ−1p | ≤ e2K .
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The problem can be written as:
max{Λˆ1,··· ,ΛˆN}
1
2
{−N +
N∑
i=1
Xi
Λi
Λˆi
+
N∑
i=1
θ2i
Λi
Λˆi
}. (18)
s.t.
N∏
i=1
Λi
Λˆi
= exp(2K)
Λi
Λˆi
≥ 1 + Λi
Λpi
, ∀i
where Xi measures the magnitude of the exploitable pricing errors in risk factor i. If an investor
becomes informed, his valuation of an asset, based on his private information, will deviate from
the realized price. We call this deviation an ‘exploitable pricing error’. Xi measures the period-1
expected squared pricing error.
Appendix H shows that exploitable pricing errors depend on how much asset prices are affected
by true payoffs (fundamentals) and by asset supply shocks:
Xi = (1− ΛB,i)2 + Λ2C,iσ2x, (19)
where ΛBi and ΛCi are the ith eigenvalues of B and C in proposition 7.
The first term shows that pricing errors increase when prices are less reflective of true payoffs.
ΛBi captures the covariance of the ith risk factor’s price with its true payoff. When ΛBi is small, a
low covariance makes exploitable pricing errors Xi large. For example, if a well-informed investor
sees a low price and knows that the true payoffs are likely to be high, he can exploit this by buying
the asset. The uninformed investor, on the other hand, knows little about the true payoff and
cannot exploit this difference.
The second term shows that pricing errors increase when prices are more reflective of supply
shocks. ΛCi is the weight of the ith risk factor’s supply shock on the factor’s price. When ΛCi
is high, supply shocks create noise in prices that is exploitable by a well informed investor. For
example, if such an investor sees a low price and knows it is due to a high supply shock, he can
exploit this by buying the asset. The uninformed investor, on the other hand, attributes this low
price to fundamentals. In sum, risk factors wit a higher Xi are more valuable to learn about,
because informed investors can make more profit.
Proposition 8. In general equilibrium with a continuum of investors, each investor’s optimal
information portfolio uses all capacity to learn about one linear combination of asset payoffs. The
linear combination weights are given by the eigenvector Γi associated with the highest value of the
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squared Sharpe ratio plus exploitable pricing error: θ2i +Xi.
Proof in appendix G. Just as in partial equilibrium, each investor continues to specialize in
learning about one risk factor. Again, the reason is that the objective function is convex in Λˆi. The
learning index θ2i +Xi determines which risk factor the investor learns about. The most valuable
risk factor to learn about has (i) a high expected return Γ′iE[f − pr], (ii) a large expected portfolio
share Γ′iE[q], and (iii) a large exploitable pricing error. The size of exploitable pricing errors is
determined by the fraction of investors who learn about risk factor i. This is a new effect that
shows up in general equilibrium only.
D. Aggregate Information Portfolios and Asset Prices
The previous section characterized the optimal information and asset allocation for an individual
investor. This section describes how these choices aggregate across investors.
Aggregate Information Allocation Learning is a strategic substitute: The more precise the
posterior beliefs of the average investor about the payoff of risk factor i, the less valuable it is to
learn about. Let Ψ be the average of investors’ signal precision matrices Ψ =
∫ 1
0 Σ
−1
ηj dj, where Σηj
is the variance-covariance matrix of the signals that investor j observes. Let ΛΨi be the eigenvalue
of Ψ corresponding to the ith risk factor.
Proposition 9. There is strategic substitutability in learning: (Xi + θ2i ) is a strictly decreasing,
monotonic function of ΛΨi.
Proof is in appendix H. When other investors learn more about a risk factor, the size of its
exploitable pricing errors and its expected return fall.
In equilibrium, ex-ante identical investors get the same expected utility from learning about
any of the risk factors that the economy learns about. The substitutability result is crucial to
preventing diversification in general equilibrium. Because of substitutability, investors want to
learn about risk factors that other investors are not learning about. If learning were a strategic
complement, investors would want to specialize in learning about the same risk factor. This would
make information symmetric: All investors would face the same payoff variance. As a result, they
would all want to hold a lot of the risk factor they learn about. Since markets must clear, and
investors each have an equal benefit of holding the asset they specialized in, they end up holding
an equal share of the market in expectation. Full diversification would arise.
Proposition 10. The number of risk factors that the economy learns about is weakly increasing in
the economy’s aggregate capacity K.
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Proof in appendix I. How much investors learn about an asset is summarized by the aggregate
precision of beliefs Σ̂−1a . Manipulating the price in proposition 7 tells us that as long as assets are
in positive net supply (x¯ > 0), the increase in information about an asset (fall in Σ̂a) will cause its
expected return to fall:
E[f − pr] = ρΣ̂ax¯. (20)
A reduction in expected return makes assets less valuable to learn about (lower θ2i in proposition
8). When more investors learn about a factor, the expected return on the assets that load heavily
on that factor falls. This makes that factor less desirable to learn about.
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Figure 4. Aggregate allocation of information capacity for low, medium, and high levels of aggre-
gate capacity K.
The equilibrium information allocations follow a cutoff rule. For intuition’s sake, consider
constructing the Nash equilibrium by letting investors sequentially choose how to allocate their
capacity. The first investor learns about the risk factor that is most valuable when no other
learning takes place. This is risk factor 1 in figure 4, the risk factor with the highest learning index
(θ2i + ρ
2σ2xΛi). This is the same risk factor as the one the partial equilibrium investor would learn
about for σ2x = 0. Subsequent investors will continue to allocate their capacity to factor 1 until the
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value of learning about risk factor 1 has dropped sufficiently that it equals the value of learning
about the next most valuable risk factor 2. This cutoff is when capacity K = K1 in figure 4. Then,
some investors will find it beneficial to learn about risk factor 2. The proportions of investors that
learn about 1 and about 2 is such that all investors remain indifferent. The reason that the first risk
factor becomes gradually less valuable to learn about is that, as more investors become informed
about it, Λˆ−1a1 increases, thereby reducing both the exploitable pricing errors X1 (proposition 9) and
the equilibrium squared Sharpe ratio θ21, the latter through a decrease in expected return (equation
20). Subsequent investors will continue to allocate capacity to these two risk factors, until all
investors become indifferent between learning about 1, 2 and some third risk factor (where K = K2
in figure 4). This process continues until all capacity is allocated. This type of result is referred
to as ‘water-filling’ in the information theory literature. Because of strategic substitutability, the
equilibrium aggregate information allocation is unique.
Asset Holdings in Equilibrium The cross-section of asset holdings is fully pinned down by
the cross-section of information allocation. The mapping is as described in proposition 2. Each
investor holds a diversified portfolio, plus a learning portfolio. The diversified portfolio now depends
on information contained in prices. The learning portfolio contains assets in proportion to the one
risk factor the investor learns about.
Atomless Investors and Limits to Arbitrage We assumed that there is a continuum of
atomless investors, who by definition, cannot impact asset prices. This matters for equilibrium
learning strategies because it makes the returns to learning unbounded. As our investor learns
more about an asset, he can take larger and larger positions in that asset to fully exploit what
he has learned, without worrying about his information being revealed through the price level. In
contrast, an investor that is large in the market will move the asset price level when he trades.
If he tries to exploit very precise information by taking large asset positions, his impact on the
market price will partially reveal what he knows. This diminishes the value of his information and
re-introduces decreasing returns to learning about a single risk factor. In figure 4, the investor is
filling a bin on his own. For example, his capacity may exceed cutoff K1.
Similar to the case where some risk is not learnable (section II.C), giving investors some mass in
the market will make them want to specialize for low levels of capacity, but broaden their learning
to multiple factors as capacity increases. In order to analyze a setting where large capacity investors
interact, we would need to model strategic investors who consider the effect of their own learning
on the price level (see Bernhardt and Taub (2005) or Pritsker (2005)). This question is beyond
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the scope of the current paper. In the conclusion, we return to the idea of modeling large portfolio
managers.
Giffen Assets The fact that investors choose to learn about assets with large exploitable pricing
errors means that assets are unlikely to be Giffen goods. In Admati (1985), investors’ demand
rises with the price of assets whose prices are very informative. Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991)
show that, with insufficient noise in prices (low Xi in our setting), a no-trade problem arises and
markets break down. But when no trade in an asset is possible, information about the asset has
no value. Less extremely, when good (bad) news about an asset’s payoff makes its price rise (fall)
dramatically, the value of such information is low (lowXi). Thus, rational learning should eliminate
precisely the situations where such market anomalies are likely to arise.
E. Cross-Section of Asset Returns
An APT Representation of Asset Prices Our theory justifies the arbitrage-free pricing theory
practice of using the principal components of the asset payoff matrix as priced risk factors (Ross
(1976)). We can rewrite the risk premium on an asset i as the sum of its loading on each principal
component k times the equilibrium risk premium of that principal component:
E[fi − rpi] =
n∑
k=1
Γik
(
Γ′kE[f − rp]
)
The equilibrium risk premium of factor k can be rewritten, using equation (20) as:
Γ′kE[f − rp] = ρΛˆak(Γ′kx¯). (21)
The equilibrium risk premium depends on (i) the risk aversion of the economy ρ, (ii) the supply
of the risk factor Γ′kx¯, and most importantly (iii) the weight Λˆak, the k
th eigenvalue of aggregate
variance matrix Σ̂a. This weight measures how much the economy (the average investor) learns
about risk factor k. A risk factor that the economy does not learn about has weight Λˆak = Λk. A
risk factor that the economy learns about has a weight Λˆak < Λk. In other words, as more investors
learn about risk factor k, Λˆak decreases, its risk premium falls. An asset that loads heavily on those
risk factors has a low risk premium. Our theory predicts which risk factors are learned about in
equilibrium (see figure 4).
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A CAPM Representation of Asset Prices The equilibrium asset prices and returns are
equivalent to the prices and returns that would arise in a representative investor economy. That
representative investor is endowed with the belief that payoffs f are normally distributed with
mean Ea[f ] and covariance Σ̂a, the heterogeneously informed investors’ arithmetic average mean
and harmonic average covariance (see equations 25 and 24 in appendix F). In our model with
heterogenous information and partially revealing prices, a version of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model holds.
Proposition 11. If the market payoff is defined as fm =
∑N
k=1(x¯ + xk)fk, the market return is
rm = fm∑N
k=1(x¯+xk)pk
, and the return on an asset i is ri = fipi , then the equilibrium price of asset i
can be expressed as
pi =
1
r
(Ea[fi]− ρCova[fi, fm]) . (22)
The equilibrium return is
Ea[ri]− r = Cova[ri, rm]
V ara[rm]
(Ea[rm]− r) ≡ βia(Ea[rm]− r). (23)
The proposition, similar to Lintner (1969), states that the equilibrium expected return on a
security is proportional to its beta and to the market price of risk expressed in beta units of a
representative investor. Without a theory of information acquisition, this pricing relationship is
not testable. The information of the representative investor used in equations (22) and (23) cannot
be observed by an econometrician or deduced from prices. Our contribution is to predict the
information set of the representative investor.
Incorporating our results into the CAPM (equation 23) can explain why a public-information
based CAPM under-prices large assets. In their seminal paper, Fama and French (1992) show that
large firms offer lower average returns than small firms for a given beta. The standard CAPM
fails to explain the cross-section of size portfolio returns because the beta for large (small) firms
is ‘too high’ (‘too low’) to account for the return difference. This beta is based on public (prior)
information. When investors can learn, the true risk of an asset depends on its ‘learning beta’
βia, which is based on public information and private information investors have chosen to learn.
Combining equations (17), (20), and proposition 8, the value of learning about risk factor i is given
by ρ2
(
Λˆai
Λi
)
(Γ′ix¯)
2Λˆai +Xi. Learning value is increasing in the size of the risk factor (Γ
′
ix¯). If large
assets load heavily on these large risk factors, the representative investor will be well-informed
about large assets. Our findings suggest that any assets that load heavily on the largest principal
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components should have returns that are lower than the standard CAPM predicts.
IV. Active Portfolio Management
While the paper’s original motivation was the composition of individual investor portfolios, the
model also dictates optimal allocations of research and financial resources for institutional investors.
It is a theory of active portfolio management. Through the lens of our theory, we see a specialized
fund, such as a hedge fund or ‘alpha-fund,’ as an optimally under-diversified component of an
institution’s portfolio. Their investment strategy is to hold assets along one risk dimension in order
to exploit the increasing returns to learning.
Optimal portfolio management is a long-standing issue in the mutual fund literature. The sem-
inal paper by Treynor and Black (1973) departs from the efficient markets hypothesis by assuming
that individual portfolio managers can exploit mis-pricing to make abnormal returns. Portfolio
managers can analyze only a limited number of securities. For each such security k, they estimate
the alpha αk = rk − r − β′i(rdiv − r) − εk, where rdiv represents diversified portfolio returns and
εk is idiosyncratic risk, with variance σ2(εk). The optimal portfolio tilts away from the diversified
one, towards securities with a high ‘information ratio’: αk/σ2(εk).9
Treynor and Black (1973) and our paper both recognize the fundamental trade-off between
diversification and specialization. However, the theories differ along several dimensions. First, ours
is an equilibrium pricing model of active portfolio management. There is no irrational mis-pricing.
A Treynor and Black (1973) regression in our model will produce α’s that capture public information
already impounded in prices. If a portfolio manager purchased stocks with a positive (public)
information ratio, his stocks would have prices that were depressed by privately informed investors’
bad news. Our theory suggests another notion of α: Investors demand different risk premia for the
same asset because they have an individual-specific α, arising from private information.
Second, instead of allowing investors to analyze a fixed set of securities, we examine the choice
of what to learn. In both models, investors who learn about an asset’s α want to take a large
position in that asset.10 But the feedback mechanism, where taking that large position makes an
investor want to learn more about the asset, is unique to our setting.
9By defining qdiv as the zero-capacity portfolio, we avoid a non-uniqueness problem of TB’s portfolio decomposi-
tion. To understand the non-uniqueness, suppose that the optimal diversified portfolio contains shares of asset 1 and
2 in the ratio of 1 to 2. The market (asset supply) is 2 shares of each asset. The asset supply can be decomposed
into one share of the diversified portfolio, plus one share of asset 1 in the learning portfolio, or alternatively into 2
shares of the diversified portfolio and two shares sold short of asset 2.
10Our model is formally equivalent to one where investors learn about α.
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V. Conclusion
Most theories of portfolio allocation and asset pricing take investors’ information as given. Inves-
tigating optimal information choice has the potential to yield valuable insights into many portfolio
and asset pricing puzzles. When investors can choose what information to acquire, given a fixed
information capacity, they optimally devote all capacity to learning about the payoffs (or alphas)
of a set of highly correlated assets. Even when some risk is not learnable, and there are diminishing
returns to learning, investors still specialize in a small number of risks. Since risk-averse investors
prefer to take larger positions in assets they are better-informed about, high-capacity investors hold
larger ‘learning portfolios’, causing their total portfolio to be less diversified. In equilibrium, in-
vestors specialize in different assets from other investors. Ex-ante identical investors may optimally
hold different portfolios.
The model has new cross-sectional asset pricing predictions. Assets that many investors learn
about command lower risk premia, than standard asset pricing models predict. These assets are
ones that co-vary with the largest principal components.
While this model has focussed on a static information allocation problem, it could be extended
along many dimensions. The quantity of information could be endogenized with a capacity pro-
duction function. A model of dynamic information choice, incorporating recent advances in the
dynamics of information value (Bernhardt and Taub (2005)), could be used to explain the per-
sistence and turnover of investor portfolio holdings and time variation in expected asset returns.
Finally, analyzing a market for information capacity could answer questions about the organization
of the portfolio management industry.
A natural question to pose in this setting is: “Why can’t an investor delegate his portfolio
management to someone who processes information for many investors?” If a manager were to sell
information, information resale would undermine their profits. To avoid this problem, they would
manage investors’ portfolios directly. If information capacity were costly, then managers would
maximize profit by each specializing in a different risk factor. Whether an investor’s portfolio will
also be concentrated hinges on how portfolio managers set prices. We conjecture that a competitive
equilibrium would have fund managers charge a non-linear fee. Such quantity discounts induce more
investment in a fund. The additional investment reduces the fund manager’s per-share cost and
allows him to compete linear-price suppliers out of the market. Quantity discounts make investing
small amounts in many funds costly. Competitive pricing of portfolio management services forces
investors to internalize increasing returns to specialization; optimal under-diversification reappears.
A theory of information choice in financial markets is vital to understanding or justifying the
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active portfolio management industry. While a formal analysis of the industry and its effect on
investor portfolios is left for future work, understanding an individual’s information choice problem
is a necessary first step.
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A. Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a deviation from this solution that would allocate some capacity to another asset j, s.t. Σ̂jj =
(1− ²)Σjj . Keeping total capacity constant implies that Σ̂ii must be increased by a factor of 1/(1− ²). This
deviation produces a net utility change
(µj − pjr)2Σ−1jj ((1− ²)− 1) + (µi − pir)2Σ−1ii (1− (1− ²))
Since i is the asset for which (µi − pir)2Σ−1ii > (µj − pjr)2Σ−1jj , for all j 6= i, the net utility change from the
deviation is negative. ¤
B. Arbitrary Risk Factor Structure
For tractability, the main text assumes that investors learn about the principal components of Σ = Γ′ΛΓ,
f ′Γ. In this appendix we show that the results of specialization does not hinge on this assumption. Let the
posterior covariance matrix be Σ̂ = Γ̂′ΛˆΓ̂, where Γ̂ is an arbitrary but fixed posterior eigenvector matrix of Σ̂.
In particular, Γ̂ 6= Γ. The objective function (8) in the partial equilibrium model (VER = Σ) then becomes:
1
2
Tr
(
Γ̂Λˆ−1Γ̂′Σ− I
)
+
1
2
(µ− pr)′Γ̂Λˆ−1Γ̂′(µ− pr).
One can write the ii element of the matrix Σ̂−1Σ as:
(
Σ̂−1Σ
)
ii
=
∑N
j=1
∑N
l=1 Γ̂ilΛˆ
−1
l Γ̂ljΣji. Since the trace
of a matrix is the sum of its diagonal elements, the objective function can be written as a sum of the {Λˆ−1l }
each weighted by a scalar τl: 12
∑N
l=1 τlΛˆ
−1
l − N2 , where τl is the learning index of the lth risk factor:
τl =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Γ̂il
(
Γ̂ljΣji + Γ̂jl(µi − pir)(µj − pjr)
)
Under the assumption Γ̂ = Γ, we recover the learning index written in the main text: τl = Λl+((µ− pr)′Γl)2.
But, whatever the exact specification of the learning index is, the investor always ranks the risk factors
according to their learning index τl, and chooses to specialize in the risk factor with the highest τl. The
reason is that the objective function is still linear in the {Λˆ−1l }, or convex in the choice variables {Λˆl}. The
first main result of specialization is not affected by the exact structure of risks that the investor learns about.
This argument applies equally to sections II.A and B, i.e. Σ diagonal or not, as this only changes τl.
The same argument holds for the general equilibrium model of section III (VER = Q − Σ̂, where Q =
Σ+BΣB′ +CC ′σ2x − 2ΣB′). Just replace the terms Σji by Qji and µ− pr by (I −B)µ−A in the learning
index. The definitions of the price coefficients A, B, and C are in the proof of proposition 7. The second
main result of strategic substitutability also does not depend on the exact structure of risks. First, note that
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the proof of the equilibrium price in appendix F does not depend on the risk structure. Second, the effect
of others’ learning choices enter through A and B in the learning index τl. For any given risk, the value of
learning about that risk declines the more others know about it.
The same argument can be made starting from some arbitrary but fixed signal eigenvector matrix Γ˜ 6= Γ
(Ση = Γ˜ΛηΓ˜′), rather than an arbitrary posterior eigenvector matrix Γ̂ 6= Γ. Because Σ̂−1 = Σ−1 + Σ−1η ,
Tr(Σ̂−1Σ− I) = Tr(Σ−1η Σ). The algebra (and the definition of the learning index) is then identical, simply
replacing Γ̂ by Γ˜ and Λˆl by Ληl. So, the objective function is a linear function of the inverse signal eigenvalues
{Λ−1ηl }, or convex in the {Ληl}, so that specialization arises again.
C. Proof of Corollary 1
Proposition 2 shows that an investor optimally chooses a portfolio with a low level of diversification, meaning
a low (|qdiv|/(|qdiv|+ |qlearn|), if and only if he has a higher information capacity. What remains to be shown
is that a higher information capacity entails a higher expected profit: E[q′(f − rp)].
The portfolio weights q can be decomposed into qdiv, the zero-capacity portfolio and qlearni =
1
ρΣii
(µˆi −
pir)(e2K − 1). The profit from the diversified portfolio E[qdiv′(f − rp)] does not vary in the information
capacityK. The profit from the learning portfolio is E
[
1
ρΣii
(µˆi − pir)(e2K − 1)(fi − rpi)
]
. This is increasing
in K if E[(µˆi − pir)(fi − rpi)] > 0. Since the difference between fi and µˆi is a mean-zero, orthogonal
expectation error,
E[(µˆi − pir)(fi − rpi)] = E[(µˆi − pir)2] + 0 > 0.
¤
D. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: An investor learns about a risk factor whenever the marginal benefit of allocating the first increment
of capacity to that risk factor (1 + θ2i )
Λi
−Λˆ2i
exceeds its marginal cost: ξ 1
Λˆi−αΛi − φi. K enters this inequality
only through the Lagrange multiplier ξ, the shadow cost of capacity. When an investor learns about asset i,
the no-negative learning constraint is no longer binding and φi = 0. For each risk factor i, there is a cutoff
value ξ?i =
Λi
Λˆi
(1 − αΛi
Λˆi
)
(
1 + θ2i
)
where marginal benefit and cost are equal. For all ξ < ξ?i , the marginal
benefit is greater than the marginal cost and the investor will learn about risk factor i. We know from the
proof of proposition 5 that ∂ξ/∂K ≤ 0. Therefore, the number of factors i for which ξ < ξ?i must be an
increasing step function in K. ¤
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof: From the proof of proposition 2, we know that a non-zero quantity of an asset is held in the learning
fund whenever the investor learns about the asset and the expected excess return is not equal to zero. Getting
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a signal from a continuous distribution that implies a zero excess return is a zero probability event. Since
asset payoffs are independent, each risk factor corresponds to one and only one asset. Proposition 4 shows
that when capacity increases, the number of risk factors learned about rises. Thus the number of assets
learned about rises, and the number of different assets held in the learning fund rises. ¤
E. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: The diversified portfolio qdiv is what the investor would hold with zero capacity. It does not change as
capacity rises. When K rises, the absolute value of E[qlearn] = 1ρ (Σ̂
−1−Σ−1)(µ−pr) is affected only through
Σ̂. How K affects Σ̂ can be seen in the first-order condition; it enters through the Lagrange multiplier ξ.
Solving for (Λi
Λˆi
− αΛi
Λˆi
2
) from equation (11) and substituting it into the capacity constraint (10) yields an
expression for the multiplier N log(ξ) =
∑N
i=1
(
2 log(Λi
Λˆi
) + log(1 + θ2i + φi)
)
+ log(1 − α) − 2K, which is
decreasing in K. Applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order condition (11), we get
∂
Λi
Λˆi
∂K ≥ 0,
for every risk factor i, with strict inequality for those risk factors that are learned about. Since {Λi
Λˆi
} are the
eigenvalues of Σ̂−1Σ, and Σ is a constant,
∂
Λi
Λˆi
∂K ≥ 0 implies that each element of the eigenvalue matrix Λˆ−1
of Σ̂−1 = ΓΛˆ−1Γ′, weakly rises with K. As a result, ∂|E[q
learn]|
∂K ≥ 0, with strict inequality for the risk factors
that the investor learns about. ¤
F. Proof of Proposition 7
From Admati (1985), we know that equilibrium price takes the form rp = A+Bf + Cx where
A =
(
Σ−1 +
1
ρ2σ2x
Ψ′Ψ+Ψ
)−1 (
Σ−1µ− ρx¯) ,
B =
(
Σ−1 +
1
ρ2σ2x
Ψ′Ψ+Ψ
)−1(
Ψ+
1
ρ2σ2x
Ψ′Ψ
)
,
C = −
(
Σ−1 +
1
ρ2σ2x
Ψ′Ψ+Ψ
)−1(
ρI +
1
ρσ2x
Ψ′
)
.
Here, Ψ is the average of investors’ signal precision matrices Ψ =
∫ 1
0
Σ−1ηj dj, and Σηj is the variance-covariance
matrix of the signals that investor j observes.11
Using (14), note that
(
Σ−1 + 1ρ2σ2xΨ
′Ψ+Ψ
)−1
= Σˆa, the posterior variance for an investor with the
11The Lebesgue integral may not be well defined when {ηj} are processes of independent random variables for a
continuum of investors j, because realizations may not be measurable with respect to the joint space of parameters
and samples. Also, the sample function giving each investor’s individual shock may not be Lebesgue measurable, and
thus the fraction of investors associated with each shock may not be well defined. Making independence compatible
with joint measurability requires defining an enriched probability space, where the one-way Fubini property holds.
Then the exact law of large numbers is restored. See Hammond and Sun (2003), and Duffie and Sun (2004) for recent
solutions.
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average of all investors’ posterior precisions:
Σˆa ≡
(∫ 1
0
Σˆ−1j dj
)−1
(24)
Note also that Σp ≡ σ2xB−1CC ′B−1
′
= ( 1ρ2σ2xΨ
′Ψ)−1.
Then, the price equation can be rewritten as
rp = Σ̂a(Σ−1µ+Ψf +Σ−1p (f − ρΨ−1x)− ρ(x¯− x)
Simple algebra reveals that (f − ρΨ−1x) = B−1(rp − A), the unbiased signal that investors observe from
the price level. From equation 3, we note that the first three terms are equal to the posterior mean of the
‘average’ investor’s beliefs:
µˆa ≡ Ea[fi] ≡
∫ 1
0
µˆjdj (25)
Thus,
rp = µˆa − ρΣ̂a(x¯+ x). (26)
The price level is increasing in the posterior belief of the average investor about the mean payoff, and
decreasing in risk aversion, the amount of risk the average investor bears, and the supply of the asset.¤
G. Proof of Proposition 8
As long as Σ̂−1 and VER have the same eigenvectors as Σ, then the proof of the proposition follows immedi-
ately from the proof of proposition 4, where E[f−pr] is now based on prior beliefs (E[f−pr] = (I−B)µ−A),
instead of on (µ − pr). Sums, products and inverses of matrices with identical eigenvectors preserve those
eigenvectors. This tells us that Ψ can be rewritten as Ψ =
∫ 1
0
Γ−1
′
Λ−1ηj Γ
−1dj. Since eigenvector matrices
have the property that Γ−1 = Γ′, and defining Λ−1ηa =
∫ 1
0
Λ−1ηj dj, this is equivalent to Ψ = ΓΛηaΓ
′. Because
Σp, Σˆa, B, and C are result from a combination of sums, products and inverses of Σ and Ψ (see appendix
F), all have eigenvectors Γ. ¤
H. Proof of Proposition 9
Proof : Xi and θ2i are both decreasing in Λψi. Thus, their sum is decreasing. We start by deriving the expres-
sion forXi. The first part of the objective is Tr
(
Σ̂−1VER
)
, which we rewrite as Tr
(
Σ̂−1ΣΣ−1(VER + Σ̂− Σ̂)
)
.
This is Tr
(
Σ̂−1ΣΣ−1(VER + Σ̂)− I
)
or Tr
(
Σ̂−1ΣΣ−1(VER + Σ̂)
)
− N . The trace is the product of the
eigenvalues. Let Λi
Λˆi
, be the ratio of the precision of the posterior to the precision of the prior, i.e. it is the
ith eigenvalue of Σ̂−1Σ: Λi
Λˆi
≡ Λˆ−1i Λi. Let Xi be the ith eigenvalue of Σ−1(VER+Σ̂). Then the ith eigenvalue
of the matrix inside the trace is Λi
Λˆi
Xi, and Tr
(
Σ̂−1ΣΣ−1(VER + Σ̂)
)
=
∑N
i=1Xi
Λi
Λˆi
. This is because Σ, Σ̂,
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B and C all share the same eigenvectors Γ.
The expression for Xi, the ith eigenvalue of Σ−1(VER+Σ̂), is Xi = Λ−1i
[
Λi
(
1 + Λ2Bi − 2ΛBi
)
+ Λ2Ciσ
2
x
]
,
where ΛBi and ΛCi are the ith eigenvalue of B and C respectively. Using the definition of B and Σˆa, we
can rewrite B as I − ΣˆaΣ−1, which has eigenvalues ΛBi = 1 − ΛˆaiΛ−1i , where Λai is the ith eigenvalue of
Σˆa. Also, using the definitions of B and C, we have C = −ρBΨ−1, and hence CC ′σ2x = B
(
1
ρ2σ2x
Ψ′Ψ
)−1
B′,
which in turn equals BΣpB′. The ith eigenvalues of the matrix Σ−1CC ′σ2x, Λ
−1
i Λ
2
Ciσ
2
x, are thus equal to
Λ−1ii Λ
2
BiΛpi = Λ
−1
i (1− ΛˆaiΛ−1i )2Λpi. Now we can rewrite Xi as:
Xi =
(
Λˆai
Λi
)2
+
(
Λpi
Λi
)(
1− Λˆai
Λi
)2
.
An important property of Xi is that it is decreasing in the average signal precision of risk factor i, ΛΨi, the
ith eigenvector of Ψ. To ease the burden of notation, define a ≡ 1ρ2σ2x , g ≡ Λ
−1
ii , and x ≡ ΛΨi. To show strict
substitutability is to show ∂Xi∂x < 0. We first recall that Λ
−1
pi = ax
2 and Λˆ−1ai = g + ax
2 + x. We can rewrite
Xi in our new notation as:
Xi = g2(g + ax2 + x)−2 + ga−1x−2(ax2 + x)2(g + ax2 + x)−2,
= g(g + ax2 + x)−2[g + a−1 + 2x+ ax2].
Taking a partial derivative with respect to x, we get:
∂Xi
∂x
= −2g(g + ax2 + x)−3[(g + a−1 + 2x+ ax2)(2ax+ 1)− (g + ax2 + x)(ax+ 1)],
= −2g(g + ax2 + x)−3[a2x3 + 3ax2 + (3 + ag)x+ a−1].
The partial derivative is strictly negative because g > 0, a > 0, x > 0, and hence the term in parentheses
and the term in brackets are strictly positive. Using L’Hoˆpital’s rule, it is easy to show that limx→0Xi =
1 + a−1g−1, which equals 1 + ρ2σ2xΛi. Because of the new source of risk induced by noisy asset supply
(σ2x), Xi is strictly greater than 1 when nobody learns about risk factor i (x = ΛΨi = 0). Note that this is
consistent with Xi = 1 in partial equilibrium, where prices we taken as given (σ2x = 0).
We conclude by showing that θ2i =
(((I−B)µ−A)′Γi)2
Λi
is decreasing in Λψi. The denominator Λii is
exogenous. Using the formulas for A and B in appendix F, the expected return is ((I − B)µ− A) = ρΣ̂ax¯.
Thus, ((I − B)µ − A)′Γi = ρΛˆai (Γ′ix¯). Since, Λˆai = (Λ−1i + 1ρsσ2xΛ
2
ψi + Λψi)
−1, the expected return and its
square are decreasing in Λψi. ¤
I. Proof of Proposition 10
From proposition 8, we know that investors always allocate their capacity to the asset with the highest value
of (Γ′iE[f −pr])2(Λi)−1+Xi. Begin by ordering risk factors by their learning index values when K = 0, such
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that (Γ′iE[f−pr])2(Λi)−1+Xi ≥ (Γ′i+1E[f−pr])2(Λi+1)−1+Xi+1. For small levels of K, capacity is allocated
only to the most valuable risk factor, say risk factor 1, and to additional risk factors, only if their initial
learning index value is equal to that of factor 1: (Γ′1E[f − pr])2(Λ˜1)−1 +X1 = (Γ′iE[f − pr])2(Λ˜i)−1 +Xi.
Is there some level of capacity Kj such that these two index levels are equal? For any non-zero index, there
must be. As K → ∞, precision of beliefs about asset 1 becomes infinite: Ψ11 → ∞. Equation (20), shows
that that (Γ′1E[f − pr])2 → 0. Furthermore Xi → 0 because there are no more exploitable pricing errors
when beliefs are infinitely precise. Since index values are non-negative, there is some Kj for each asset j s.t.
∀K > Kj , investors learn about risk factor j. ¤
J. Proof of Proposition 11
We can rewrite equation (26) for each asset i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} separately:
pi =
1
r
(
µˆia − ρ
N∑
k=1
Cova[fi, fk](x¯+ xk)
)
=
1
r
(
µˆia − ρCova[fi,
N∑
k=1
(x¯+ xk)fk]
)
where Cova[fi, fk] denotes the (i, k) element of Σˆa. Using the definition of fm stated in the proposition,
we obtain the first equation mentioned in the proposition: pi = 1r (Ea[fi]− ρCova[fi, fm]). To rewrite this
equilibrium price function in terms of returns divide both sides by the price. Denote the return on security
i by ri ≡ fipi . Simple manipulation leads to:
Ea[ri]− r = ρCova[ri, fm]. (27)
This is true for each asset i, and hence also for asset m:
Ea[rm]− r = ρ pmCova[rm, rm]. (28)
Solving (28) for the risk aversion coefficient ρ, and substituting it into (27), we get the second equation in
the proposition.¤
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